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The Good Society

The Good Society
Amitai Etzioni1
This essay explores some of the elements of what makes for a good
society—or community—from a communitarian viewpoint, with consideration from a combination of social facts as seen by a sociologist.
Additionally, ethical considerations, with special attention paid to exclusivity
and to equality, are addressed.

COMMUNITIES DEFINED
A key concept I draw upon in the following characterization of a good
society is the term community. I define it as follows:
Community is a combination of two elements: A) A web of affectladen relationships among a group of individuals, relationships
that often crisscross and reinforce one another—rather than merely
one-on-one or chainlike individual relationships; B) A measure of
commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a
shared history and identity—in short, to a particular culture.2
The observation that social entities that meet the above two defining
criteria can be identified and that they resemble those entities most people
informally refer to as communities does not claim that such social entities
are good in the normative sense. Furthermore, this definition leaves open
the amount of conflict that occurs within a given community, but identifies it
as a social entity that has the elements necessary—bonds and shared values—
to contain conflict within sustainable boundaries. Lastly, the definition
indicates that communities need not be territorial. Indeed, there are many
ethnic, professional, gay, and other communities that are geographically
dispersed; that is, the members of these communities reside among people
who are not members. Often, these communities are centered around
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particular institutions such as places of worship, hiring halls, bars, or social
clubs. So, with these caveats in mind, I will examine both the elements of
community-bonding and the common moral culture.

THE VALUE OF BONDS AND THEIR LIMITS
The idea that people ought to be related to one another by bonds of
affection rather than merely treat each other as instruments is widely established. From Kant to Marx, many consider the dominance of the instrumental orientation a major threat to human well-being. Others have drawn
on empirical research to document that people are social creatures and
require bonding with one another for their mental and physical well-being.
Thus, it would at first seem that bonds are good per se.
This view reflects a Western context, in which bonding is believed to have
declined over the last century, as noted in the work of Robert Putnam.3 More
attention, however, should also be paid to the condition in which bonding is
excessive. Here, I refer not only to hierarchy, power relations, or oppressive
legal or moral codes, all of which have negative aspects. But also, I refer to
communities in which bonds, even those among peers, are restrictive, preventing proper development of self, cramping individuality, spontaneity, and
creativity, a condition which, until recently, many have associated with the
Japanese society.
Novelists have been especially effective in describing the loss of selfidentity and autonomy of those slavishly in love; of women who lose their
self identity when defined merely as mothers and wives; of teenagers and
gang members who are lost in their peer groups.
It follows that both frayed bonds and tightly knit ones are incompatible
with basic human needs;4 that social bonds are essential for human wellbeing, but only if they remain rather slack; and that one attribute of a good
society is that it is one in which strong communal bonds are balanced by
powerful protections of self. Such a society is not simply communal, but
also firmly upholds both social ties and autonomy, social order and liberty.
Thus, different societies may need to move in opposite directions—to
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approach the same point of balance. For example, some societies must shore
up their weakened social bonds, while others must loosen them.

EXCLUSIVITY LIMITED BY LAWS
Given the realities of social life, all communities have built into them by
their very nature a serious normative defect: they exclude. All communities
draw distinctions between members and nonmembers, and they usually treat
nonmembers less well than members. Exclusivity arises out of one of the
two defining elements of community—that of bonding. There are severe
limits to the number of people any one person can bond with. Moreover,
bonding is much more achievable with people who are similar in social
background and perspective than with those whose social attributes are
different. Finally, turnover must be limited if bonds are to solidify.
The fact that communities exclude is normatively troubling to the point
that one may regard communities negatively merely on this ground and
prefer to limit social relations to those based on universal criteria such as
individual achievements. Consistent champions of this approach reject treating legal immigrants differently than illegal immigrants or members of our
national community differently than those of others. However, a society that
seeks complete elimination of exclusivity will grossly neglect the profound
human need for social bonds.
Given this background, the quest for a good society points to one that
allows communities to maintain some limitations on new membership while
at the same time greatly restrict the criteria that communities may use in
forming such exclusivity. The criteria for exclusion cannot be race, ethnic
origin, religion, sexual orientation, or a host of other criteria based on
ascribed statuses. Rather, the bonds of good communities, it follows, should
be based on affinities whose nature remains to be defined.

CONFLICT WITHIN CONSENSUS
The concept of society as a community has long been criticized. After all,
this notion is Durkheimian in the sense that it presupposes one societal
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entity and asks if the conditions that its continued integrity requires are met.
Critics, from Jeremy Bentham to Margaret Thatcher, have argued that the
very concept of society is a fiction; rather, there are only aggregates of
individuals. 5 Indeed, social conservatives historically used to call for
national unity, urging people to refrain from fighting for that which was due
them individually, so as to preserve the organic whole. Left-leaning scholars
such as Lewis Coser have maintained that the concept of community
conceals that society is an arena of conflict, not one of unity.6
Nevertheless, the concept of society as a community is viable, especially
if one treats it not as a given but as a variable. That is, some societies are
much more of a community than others, and their communal quality changes
over time. Most importantly, there is nothing inherent in the concept of
society or community to exclude conflict. The only assumption that the
concept makes is that conflicts are contained by an overarching commitment
to the bonds and values that define the whole. If this is not the case, we do
not have one community or society. Therefore, it might be most productive
to stop viewing consensus and conflict models strictly as alternatives and
instead see them as combinable. After all, there is room for conflict within
consensus, as long as such clashes do not break out of the containing bonds
and culture. One may well wish to study the conditions under which conflicts are sustained within communal boundaries as opposed to outside the
community. But such an approach only highlights the value of the basic
concept—that of community—rather than finding it invalid or biased.
A good society, it follows, is one that keeps conflicts within the bounds
of shared bonds and culture. However, there is nothing in the definition of
community, and hence society, that requires that the said bonds themselves
will not be changed over time.

COMMUNITY AND INEQUALITY
An additional normative issue raised when one seeks to assess the value
of communities is the relationship between the close social bonds that exist
within communities and the allocation of resources. Much has been written
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about this subject; the following are merely a few observations about this
discussion.
Most observers readily agree that equality among members, as a general
attribute, is neither possible nor desirable. For instance, there are
considerable limits on the extent to which beauty and musical talents can be
equalized, and it is not immediately obvious that all these kinds of equalities
would be good. Even achieving merely equality of economic assets, power,
and social status—if by that one means every community member receives
the same share, or even “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs”7 —is an extremely elusive goal and not necessarily a good
objective. For instance, these ideas are believed to grossly undermine
efficiency and productivity, which no community can completely ignore. We
should therefore be concerned with greatly reducing inequality, rather than
with equality as the end state.
A good society can reduce inequality to a larger extent than the one provided by the Rawlsian rule of approving of increased inequality as long as
the have-nots benefit from the increased resources that result from the growing share of the haves even when the haves’ share increases much more than
that of the have-nots.8 This formula puts no upper limit on how much more
the haves may gain or on the growing disparity between the haves and the
have-nots. For example, in the 1990s, worker salaries increased by 32%
while Chief Executive Officer salaries increased by 535%.9 Such high and
rising levels of inequality threaten to split society into two separate camps:
One is a bit better off, but falls ever further behind the first camp, while the
other is affluent and gaining. Given that control of economic resources is
correlated with political power, growing inequality must be expected to
undermine not merely the societal bonds but also the democratic elements of
society. It follows that a good society would not only secure a “generous
minimum” for all its members, but would also labor to cap inequality by
slowing down increases in the slices of the total resources gained by the
higher strata.10 These rules would apply to each community.
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When the discussion focus moves from the level of communities to that
of societies, the latter is often depicted as if it were an aggregate of individuals. Thus, typical discussions of American consumers, voters, or even
citizens evoke the image of millions of individual actors, each acting on his
or her own, and, in accumulation, affecting the direction of the economy,
polity, and society. Actually, even in the most modernized societies, many
individually are members of communities. Indeed, it is best to think about
societies as communities of communities, which also contain a fair number
of unaffiliated individuals.
It follows that, in seeking to characterize a good society, inequalities in
allocation of resources among communities and not just among individuals
must be taken into account. For example, in 1997, a public school located
in New York City’s Greenwich Village was poised to layoff a teacher
considered a fine instructor by her school because of budget pressures.11
Concerned parents raised funds to enable the district to keep the teacher on
its payroll.12 The chancellor of the city’s school system objected on the
grounds that these parents were giving something extra to the children of
their community rather than to all of the city’s children.13 But the sociological rules of gravity again assert themselves. As in thousands of school
districts across the country, where parents do extra things for their school
despite court rulings calling for inter-district equality, the Greenwich
Village school was allowed to keep the teacher with the district paying the
teacher’s salary.
However much one may cherish equality, the quest for a good society
must recognize that equality among communities has never been approximated, even during the heyday of the Soviet regime, or under Cuban
socialism, or even among Kibbutzim. Instead, a good society applies to
inter-community allocation of assets the same rules already outlined for
members of any one community. No community should be left without a
rich and rising minimum, and the shares attained by any one community
ought to be capped. In short, a good society is one in which inequality within
each community and among them is being significantly reduced.
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WHOSE VALUES? MORAL DIALOGUES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
The second element of community, as defined here, is much more difficult to evaluate and raises numerous taxing questions. A community is not
merely a social entity whose members are bound by a web of crisscrossing
affective bonds but is also one in which members share a set of core
values—a moral culture. A good society, rich in communities, is by definition one governed not merely by contracts, voluntary arrangements, and laws
freely enacted, but also by a thick layer of mores that are in turn derived
from values. This raises several questions: Where do these values emanate
from? Are they justifiable? Are they good?
A common answer is that values are handed down from generation to
generation and, in this sense, are traditional. Tradition, however, is clearly
not the only source of values. So, what are the other major sources of values
and how does one determine the moral standing of any particular set of
values, regardless of their source?
In addressing this question, it is important to distinguish between the
initiation of values and their establishment as social norms. New value
formulations are often the work of one person such as a rebelling clergy
member like Martin Luther, a public leader like Rachel Carson, or a social
philosopher like Martin Buber. 14 In order for values to acquire social
significance, however, they must be embraced by a considerable number of
people. For members of a community to integrate new values into their moral
culture, these values must undergo a process I refer to as a “moral dialogue.”15
Moral dialogue is a process by which people engage in deliberations that
involve not merely facts and logic, reasoning, and rational exchanges, but
also intensive discussions in which their normative commitments are engaged.
Over recent decades, American society has had moral dialogues on matters
such as our obligations to the environment, to marriage partners, and to
children. There have also been moral dialogues about proper race relations,
relations between men and women, relations between heterosexuals and
homosexuals, as well as numerous other subjects. Dialogues such as these
are often complex and massive, and they frequently appear disorderly. How-
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ever, several of these have advanced to a point that resulted in extensive,
although never universal, changes in the values endorsed by members of the
society. Thus, the values of American society regarding many of the subjects listed above, from commitments to the environment to relationships
among people of different social categories, have changed significantly over
the last decades.
A good society relies heavily on such moral dialogues to determine the
values that will constitute the shared cultures of its communities; it does not
merely base its values on tradition. Moreover, to ensure broad and genuine
adherence to values, a good society relies on the moral voice—the informal
controls members of communities exert on one another—rather than law.
The law has often been viewed as the tool of society that ensures that
millions of its members will live up to the prescriptions contained in the
society’s values. Indeed, one obvious sociological function of the law is to
prescribe how people are expected to behave (from paying taxes to meeting
obligations to caring for children). The law also prescribes what people should
refrain from doing (from smoking in defined public spaces to selling, buying, or consuming crack cocaine). Usually, laws also contain penalties to be
meted out and sometimes rewards to be accorded for those who ignore, or
live up to, these normative prescriptions.
When values are less and less heeded, it is often argued that the society
requires more laws, more regulations, stronger sanctions, more law enforcement resources and powers, and more severe punishments for those who
violate the laws. Indeed, in most Western societies, one can observe that
over the past several decades as social order has deteriorated, there have
been increasing demands for more and harsher punishments, more police,
and more powers to various public authorities. However, the rising economic
and social cost of this approach to value-enforcement—as demonstrated by
the failing war against controlled substances and the fact that while crime
has recently declined in the United States, it is still at much higher levels
than it was a generation ago—shows that the high reliance on law enforcement for value fortification does not make for a good society.16
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In contrast, for a society to be good, much of the social conduct must be
regulated by reliance on the moral voice rather than on the law, and the scope
of the law itself must be limited largely to that which is supported by the
moral voice. This is the case because the moral voice can be made more
compatible with a high level of respect for self, with autonomy, and, hence,
with a good society. Here again, the good society is defined as one that
balances two values, social order and autonomy, rather than maximizing one.17
If people ignore the law, their wages are garnished, their mortgages are
foreclosed, and their homes are sold out from under them; they are jailed or
even executed. Their autonomy is restricted or curtailed. The notion advanced by some philosophers that the actor always has a choice, even if he
or she has to choose to die, is belied by those who are forced to change
course by being restrained, jailed, or forcibly evicted from protest sites. For
example, in 1995, individuals from Greenpeace were removed from nuclear
testing sites by French authorities.18 Their choices were curtailed if not preempted entirely. In contrast, when one disregards the moral voice one may
still proceed, although some social costs may be attached. That is, the person’s
basic autonomy is maintained. Therefore, law in a good society is first and
foremost the continuation of morality by other means.
The limited ability to rely on law to introduce social changes that are not
backed up by values members of the community truly accept, and the severe
distorting effects that result if this is tried, are highlighted by the failure of
many prison authorities to prevent inmates from dealing drugs in jails. If
authorities cannot enforce a law there, where they have the perpetrators locked
up twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, under constant and close
supervision, with almost no autonomy, how can one expect to enforce a law
this way in a free society?
Often, when one points to the merits of greater reliance on the moral voice
and less on law enforcement, which is an approach that assumes that one seeks
to mainly sustain values that are supported by the moral dialogues of the communities, one is asked which public policies would serve this purpose? What
public policies, regulations, and administrative acts should be introduced?
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The answer that is compatible with the vision of a good society spelled
out here is that the best way to change the direction of a society is to have
megalogues about the substance of members’ values and the intensity of their
commitments to values they affirm. By megalogue, I mean a society-wide
dialogue, one that links many community dialogues into one, often nationwide, give and take. While at first it may seem that it is impossible to have a
society-wide dialogue, such megalogues, often triggered by some dramatic
event or deliberately staged drama, occur almost incessantly about one topic
or another. For example, oil spills served to trigger megalogues about the
environment; the Thomas-Hill hearings about sexual harassment; the impeachment hearings about what constitutes offenses that will drive an elected
official out of office. It is true that megalogues are fuzzy in the sense that
one cannot determine a priori with any precision when the process will be
completed, which values will prevail, or which new public policies will be
endorsed. In effect, one can only predict that the process often will be
disjointed, emotive, repetitive, and meandering. But these qualities are
earmarks of processes that truly engage a mass of people in examining, redefining, and redirecting their values and moral commitments; they point to
the kind of moral dialogues that are essential for truly endorsed social change.
All this is not to deny that laws and public policies have a place in societal
change, including moral regeneration, but rather to stress that they are not
the main factor. Most importantly, in order for a good society to evolve, the
laws and public policies themselves must reflect the change in values rather
than significantly diverge from them. This is the case because the more a
society relies on members’ convictions that the societal demands on them
are just, and the more they conduct themselves voluntarily in line with these
values because they themselves subscribe to them, the better the society. To
put it more sharply, the good society is not first and foremost one of lawand-order, but one based on shared moral values that the members affirm.
A main criticism of my position is that the outcomes of megalogues
reflect not the true preferences of the members of the society, but rather those
preferences fostered by the media and the organizations and people that
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control its various forms, since use of the media is an essential tool of
megalogues. Because this is a subject that cannot be properly treated as an
aside in an essay of this scope, I will simply state that, to the extent the
power structure of a society prevents authentic megalogues from encompassing most members of the society, it cannot be a good society. In a good
society, the public would own large segments of the media, which is somewhat the case with BBC and NPR. Social restructuring and public education
would have to ensure that people have the basic economic, social, and intellectual conditions that enable them to participate in the megalogues. For
instance, to the extent that megalogues take place on the Internet, with widespread access, and are not burdened by economic concerns to the point that
people cannot find the time and energy to participate, the conditions for
an authentic megalogue exist. At the same time, it should be noted that
although all media, even small town gossip, have some distorting effects, the
magnitude of such distortion is often vastly exaggerated.
The Soviet experience shows that, even when a state has near total control of the media as well as the educational systems, it still cannot control
public opinion. Moreover, the results of American megalogues are often not
in line with what one would assume those who own or control the media
would prefer. Most importantly, to return one more time to sociological
realism rather than utopian writing, the media can be much improved but not
circumvented if society-wide megalogues are to take place.

GOOD V. “BAD” VALUES
Although sharing values is a defining attribute of communities, to reiterate, one should not assume that all communities, or communities per se, are
good. An essential part of their evaluation entails determining not merely
whether they share values, but the moral standing of the values they do share.
Some have argued that if shared values arise out of moral dialogues,
whether limited to communities or extended to society-wide megalogues,
the resulting consensus legitimates the outcome. Others have posited that if
certain procedures are followed the results will be morally sound. However,
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a simple mental experiment raises troubling questions about consensus and
other procedure-based criteria: If the members of a given community agree
unanimously to lynch strangers who stray onto their turf, burn books, or treat
women as second class citizens, obviously this consensus does not make
these agreements morally good ones. That is, we are drawing on external
and substantive criteria to evaluate the values that communities have come
to share as a result of dialogues judging the moral standing of values handed
down from previous generations.
Ethicists have developed some criteria to determine which values are
morally superior to others. For instance, those values that are symmetrical,
applying to ego the same way they apply to alter ego, are deemed superior to
those that do not.19 But the quest for the values defining the good society
may well not be satisfied by such formal criteria.
Several attempts have been made to find the elusive criteria. Some
recently have turned to biology; after all, we are all said to be hardwired one
way or the other. But even if this is true, one wonders whether such wiring
serves merely as a constraint on what a community can do or whether it also
provides opportunities from which a community can build. In any case,
biological factors do not define that which is good. Others have tried to base
their ethical systems on those values all societies share, that every human
society endorses.20 While there are disagreements over the reach of this list,
it is actually rather meager. Thus, even health care and freedom from starvation are not seen as universal values.21 Still others have developed a
calculus of harm according to which acts that cause less harm than others are
deemed moral, a criteria that is extremely situational.22 Moreover, it hides
the implicit value judgments evident in decisions such as how far into the
future consequences are taken into account as well as the weight one assigns
to various affected groups.
A possible source for overarching criteria are those values that, to use the
language of the founding fathers of the republic, are “self-evident.”23 In
ethics one refers to deontology, a system based on the values that convey
compelling moral causes.24 A case in point is the observation that truth-
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telling is, on the face of it, morally superior to lying—excluding such
limiting conditions as, for example, if one were hiding Jews and a Nazi asked
of their whereabouts. Analysis—for instance, along the Kantian line that
if one person lies, soon others will follow, and then the liar will suffer—
follows and might cement or undermine the initial judgment, but its original
and basic source is the fact that certain moral truths speak to us in compelling terms.25
Ultimately, the quest for the values of the good society may require
combining all these sources: local consensus, worldwide parallelism, formal
and procedural criteria, as well as the sense that certain values are selfevident. One may follow different considerations, but without some such
combination of ethics and sociology, a good society cannot be characterized.
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